We address the performance of selfish network routing in multi-commodity flows where the latency or delay function on edges is dependent on the flow of individual commodities, rather than on the aggregate flow. An application of this study is the analysis of a network with differentiated traffic, i.e., in transportation networks where there are multiple types of traffic and in networks where traffic is prioritized according to type classification. We consider the inefficiency of equilibrium in this model and provide price of anarchy bounds for networks with k (types of) commodities where each link is associated with heterogeneous polynomial delays, i.e., commodity i on edge e faces delay specified by h e i (f 1 (e), f 2 (e), . . . , f k (e)) where f i (e) is the flow of the ith commodity through edge e and h e i () a polynomial delay function applicable to the ith commodity. We consider both atomic and non-atomic flows and show bounds on the price of anarchy that depend on the relative impact of each type of traffic on the edge delay where the delay functions are polynomials of degree θ, e.g., i a i f i (e) θ . The price of anarchy is unbounded for arbitrary polynomials.
Introduction
A typical road network serves multiple types of traffic and each type has a different impact on the delay experienced on a link. The same is also true for computer network routing where traffic of different types may be generated via priority mechanisms. The common theme in these networks is the lack of a centralized control, and thus each source-destination pair chooses routes based on optimizing an objective. This problem can be modeled using game theory where each agent or player selfishly chooses its route, with Nash equilibrium being achieved when all the players have an optimum route for their own traffic, given the routes of the other players as fixed. There are two categories of games considered, the non-atomic routing game, where each player controls a negligible amount of traffic and the atomic routing game, where each user can utilize only one routing path to satisfy its requirement.
These routing games can be formalized as weighted congestion games on a network, where traffic requirements of multiple types of network users are to be routed between corresponding source and destination pairs. Each edge has a delay (latency) function that is dependent on the traffic of each user type present on that edge. To satisfy their traffic requirements, users determine their own routes using a selfish routing strategy (one that minimizes the delay faced on the paths chosen by the individual user). A centralized optimal routing solution would optimize user routes with respect to a measure of social benefit, the typical objective being the sum total of delays faced by the users; however the selfish strategic routing game introduces inefficiencies since Nash equilibrium solutions, being optimal for each individual player given the strategies of other players, do not necessarily optimize the social benefit. Our focus of study is the inefficiency of network routing games that consider multiple types of traffic.
The degradation of network performance that results from competitive selfish routing, as compared to a global optimum solution, and measured with respect to the total latency or delay of the flow has been quantified in [13, 27] where they considered the price of anarchy (PoA). In the flow routing context, this is defined to be the ratio of the total latency of the Nash equilibrium routing to the total latency of the optimum routing. The bounds that have been obtained in these previous works apply to latency or delay on edges that are a function of the aggregate flow on the edge. In this paper we consider an important generalization that models the above mentioned scenario of heterogeneous traffic on k-commodity networks: in this model, edges are associated with delay functions that are dependent on the type of the commodity, which we term as heterogeneous delay functions. An example is a polynomial delay of the form i a i (e)f θ i (e) + c(e) with positive co-efficients and non-negative constant, where f i (e) represents the traffic contribution of the ith commodity on edge e, and θ ∈ N the degree of the polynomial.
In general, we model the total delay in heterogeneous networks using the following total (heterogeneous) delay function:
i,e f i (e)Φ i e (f 1 , . . . , f k ) = i,e f i (e)h e i (f 1 (e), f 2 (e), . . . , f k (e)) where f i (e) is the flow function and h e i : R k → R + a convex, monotonically increasing, polynomial delay function for commodity i on edge e, respectively. Note that the distinctive property of this delay function is that the domain is multi-dimensional. If the delay function, Φ i e (f (e)), is expressible as h e (f 1 (e), f 2 (e), . . . , f k (e)), i.e., the delay function on the edge is independent of the commodity, then we call this delay function decomposable. This is an interesting class of functions, since it addresses the case when the delay on an edge is the same as experienced by each of the multiple types of users. We also consider uniform delay functions where the delay on every edge of the network is the same function of the flow; however, the constant term may differ.
The generalized model we consider, has applications in transport networks utilized by heterogeneous modes of transport and studied by Dafermos in [8] . Both decomposable and uniform delay models are also applicable in the study of road networks. The uniform model is applicable when roads are of the same or similar type, the delays having the same functional dependency on the flow vector. As another application, in the context of internet traffic we propose the use of this model when traffic is prioritized (applicable to the net-neutrality debate [18, 20] ). Users with higher priority are allowed to transmit more bits over a fixed period (unit) of time or equivalently are allowed to transmit larger packets of information thus occupying the link for a longer fraction of time. Consequently, the contribution of the delay induced by each type of user traffic is different. We provide additional discussion of these motivating applications, including priority queue models, later in the section. A detailed analysis of priority models forms an interesting topic of further research.
We study Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in the defined heterogeneous delay model: our results show that the PoA worsens as compared with networks models where the delay is only a function of f (e), the aggregate flow on the edge. This indicates that type differentiation amongst traffic can lead to a worse price of anarchy, a result that contrasts with the price of anarchy in the case of uniform and equal treatment of traffic types.
We consider both atomic and non-atomic flows, discussed above. In both categories, we provide upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy when there are k types of commodities in networks with heterogeneous and decomposable (including uniform) class of polynomial delay functions. In particular, we show asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy when the edges are associated with affine decomposable delay functions.
Previous Work: The study of equilibrium in flow routing problems was initiated by Pigou [21] , and furthered by Wardrop [28] . Dafermos and Sparrow [11] furthered this study and considered the relationship between flows that are at Nash Equilibrium and flows that optimize a social welfare function. For a multi-commodity flow network with convex delay functions on the edges, they establish a condition under which the flow satisfies both Nash Equilibrium conditions and also optimizes an aggregate objective function. In this model the delay is a function only of the total flow through the edge. The assumption is that units traveling along a link uniformly share the cost [11] . The interesting aspect of this work is that for homogeneous polynomial costs that are a function of the aggregate variable f (e), Nash equilibrium and social optimum solutions coincide. This is not so in a general setting. Investigation of the inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium [12] in network flows led to an analysis of price of anarchy for load dependent delays [13] . Roughgarden and Tardos initiated the study of bounds on the price of anarchy [27] in general networks followed by subsequent results of Roughgarden [24, 25, 26] that use the Pigou bound. Additional results may be found by Correa et al. [6, 7] in their studies of the price of anarchy with respect to the total latency as well as the average and the maximum latency. An aspect that distinguishes the research in [7] is their use of geometric analysis in computing the price of anarchy. The results in [27, 24] show that for polynomial delays, the price of anarchy is bounded by the degree of the polynomial and does not depend on the size of the network. This is indeed a surprising result. As an extension, our results provide bounds for the more general class of heterogeneous delay functions that depend on the characteristics of the delay function. For the case when the min-max delay of paths is used as the social welfare measure, results of Weitz [29] and in [14] show that for arbitrary increasing delay functions, the price of anarchy does depend on the size of the network.
For atomic flows, the price of anarchy [4] has been investigated for the typical unsplittable model with aggregate delay functions, i.e., delays are independent of types of commodities. The results show that the bound is dependent on the degree of the polynomial used to model the delay (O(d d ) where d is the degree of the polynomial). Further, improved and exact bounds were proved on the worst-case PoA for unweighted and weighted in atomic unsplittable congestion games in [3] . Techniques that depend on Pigou bounds do not carry over and the authors utilize the similarity of Nash equilibrium solutions with solutions obtained by a greedy algorithm for an on-line version of the problem. Note that Nash equilibrium solutions satisfy a variational inequality arising from local optimality conditions. We utilize this approach to provide bounds on the price of anarchy for networks with generalized heterogeneous delay functions; the analysis is based primarily on variational inequalities that arise in the atomic version of the problem.
The notion of commodity dependent delays was first studied in Dafermos [8, 9] in which the author considers a transportation network where travel time on a link depends on the delays of the types of traffic. One example of such a delay function, for edge e and commodity i, is provided by Φ i e (f 1 , . . . , f k ) = j g ij (e)f i (e)f j (e) + h i (e)f i (e), where g ij and h i are constants and i, j represent commodities. Dafermos [8, 9] establishes a condition ([g ij ] must be a positive definite matrix) under which the flow (i) satisfies Nash Equilibrium conditions and (ii) optimizes an aggregate objective function.
Further related work is the research on player-specific congestion games [15, 2] , a model which allows for player specific delays but which still uses the aggregate flow to compute delays.
To our knowledge, the price of anarchy for heterogeneous latency functions has not been studied before.
Motivation We outline motivations from two different areas, one being transportation engineering and the other computer networks.
Transportation Networks. In transportation science, traffic equilibrium has been considered extensively to analyze transportation systems, starting with the work of Wardrop. Note that this prior work has limitations in modeling multiple vehicle types or multi-modal networks. In order to provide more accurate modeling, transportation science models were extended to the multi-class model where the demand is partitioned into multiple classes and the cost of a route is dependent on the traffic of all user classes along the route [9] .
Multi-class models have been defined to extend the notion of Wardrop equilibrium, by Dafermos and Potts and Oliver [22, 9] , where in the latter paper they used the generalized BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) model that depend on multiple class parameters. Multi-class models may also be found in [17] .
Computer Networks. Another motivation of this research comes from a study of the impact of providing differentiated service to different types of traffic. Suppose we have k types of traffic and traffic types are given priorities. The delay function for the class with the kth priority in a M/G/1 queuing system is
is the mean residual service time and ρ k is the load of the class-k traffic. The average delay is obtained from the expected delay of all commodities [5] . As a first attempt to study selfish behavior in queues with differentiated service rates, these delays may be modeled by a polynomial, possibly a monomial using the dominant term obtained from a Taylor series expansion. The study of polynomial delay functions that is reported in this paper is applicable in this context. Furthermore, in this paper we utilize the traditional routing model where users are able to plan routing paths based on the delays in the network. These results thus apply to transportation network and computer network routings that rely on the link state of the network. A possible extension would be to find the price of anarchy when other internet routing models are used [19] .
Before we outline our results we present our model and some formal definitions:
Model and Definitions
We consider a directed network G = (V, E) with a vertex set V , an edge set E, and a set K of k ∈ N source-destination pairs {s 1 , t 1 }, . . . , {s k , t k }, each corresponding to a different traffic type. We do not allow self-loops for any vertex but accept parallel edges between any pair of vertices. For commodity i, denote the set of (simple) s i -t i paths by P i , and define a set of paths P = P i . For any path P ∈ P i , define a flow, f i P ∈ R + to be the flow of commodity i that is assigned to path P . The set of all flows is represented by the flow vector f = (f i P ) i∈K,P ∈P i . For a fixed flow f , commodity i and an edge e ∈ E denote the flow of commodity i through edge e by f i (e) = P ∈P i |e∈P f i P and the flow vector on the edge by f (e) = (f i (e)) i∈K . The total aggregate flow through edge e is denoted by ||f (e)|| 1 = i f i (e). The demand requirement of commodities 1 through k is denoted by R = (r 1 , . . . , r k ) where r i ∈ N represents the amount of flow required to be routed from source s i to destination t i . A feasible flow f is one where the demand requirement for each commodity is satisfied, i.e., P ∈P i f i P = r i , ∀i. We let Φ e : R k → R + be a heterogeneous delay function, as defined below, on edge e, and assume that Φ e (f (e)), f (e) ∈ R k is monotonically increasing w.r.t components of f (e) and convex. The delay experienced by commodity i on a path P ∈ P i is defined to be
where Φ i e (f 1 (e), . . . , f k (e)) is the delay faced by commodity i on edge e, given the flow vector f and will be represented by Φ i e (f (e)). Furthermore, f i (e) will be referred to as f i when e is evident from the context.
A heterogeneous delay function is a generalization of the standard aggregate delay function. We consider polynomial heterogeneous delay functions where the delay function on edge e for commodity i is represented by Φ i e (f (e)) = 1≤ ≤N i e g i (e)h i (f, e) + c i (e) where ∀(i, , e), g i (e) and c i (e) are nonnegative real valued constants. Here, h i (f, e) is any arbitrary monomial (with co-efficient one) in terms of the flow vector f and dependent on edge e; and there are N i e terms in the polynomial Φ i e (f ). Unfortunately, these functions will be shown to have unbounded price of anarchy (see Section 2.2, in particular Lemma 2.3).
As in [4] , we study polynomials that are of the form i a i x θ i , where θ ∈ N and ∀i : a i ∈ R ++ . We actually consider a class of more general polynomials that extend this form. Any polynomial delay that does not have the defined structure of terms will be shown to have a price of anarchy that is dependent on requirements or is unbounded. We formalize this set of polynomials below.
We define a delay to be a θ-complete polynomial delay (or simply θ-polynomial delay), θ ∈ N, if the delay function is of the form:
where L i e ∈ N and ∀ , θ j ∈ N, θ j < θ with k j=1 θ j = θ. Also, ∀(i, j, e): a ij (e) ∈ R ++ and ∀(i, , e): g i (e), c(e) ∈ R + . Let N i e = L i e +k+1 denote the number of terms in the polynomial Φ i e . Further, we use N Φ = max i,e N i e to represent the maximum number of terms in the polynomial Φ i e (f ) over all i ∈ K and e ∈ E. Note that for linear functions, N Φ is bounded by k + 1, the number of traffic types. We assume w.l.o.g that all positive coefficients and constants are scaled uniformly to be greater than one. Moreover, with this assumption, the maximum value of the ratio of the co-efficients and constants, i.e. max{max i, ,e g i (e), max i,j,e {a ij (e)}, max i,e c i (e)}, is denoted by a max .
In the case of heterogeneous delay functions, as defined above, each commodity has a different, commodity related, delay function on the same edge e. However, under the condition that ∀(i, e): g i (e) = g (e), h i (e) = h (e) and ∀(i, j, e): c i (e) = c j (e) = c(e), the polynomial heterogeneous delay function Φ i e (f ) (with L e ∈ N monomial terms) is expressible as
Such a delay function is termed as decomposable.
Additionally, we define uniform functions as decomposable delay functions of the form: Φ e (f ) = 1≤ ≤L Φ g h (f ) + c(e), where the delay function (with L Φ monomial terms) is the same function of the flow, across all edges. Note that the constant term is still edge dependent. Such a function may be used to model a network where the queues on each edge have the same parameters arising from using the same underlying technology.
Both, non-atomic and atomic flows are considered in this paper. In non-atomic flows, the flow of the ith commodity on a path P ∈ P i can be arbitrarily small, representing the fact that the player corresponding to any one commodity controls a negligible amount of traffic, resulting in multiple paths being used to satisfy requirements. In atomic flows, each commodity i can use only one path to push the required units of flow r i ∈ N.
We represent a network flow routing game by the triple G = (G, R, Φ). For a game G, we define the social cost to be the sum total of all delays on edges over flows of all commodities, i.e., C(f ) = e i f i (e)Φ i e (f (e)). Let f N E andf be a Nash Equilibrium and a social optimum flow, respectively and let the social optimum cost C SO (f ) = min f C(f ) wheref = arg min f C(f ). The price of anarchy is defined as:
where N (G) is the set of all Nash Equilibrium solutions of the game G.
Results
Our study of equilibrium flows in networks with heterogeneous delay functions provides multiple results on the existence of equilibrium and the price of anarchy. We describe below, the results that we obtained for both the the non-atomic and atomic models.
Results for Non-atomic Network Flows: To analyze this class of problems, we introduce a multi-dimensional version of the Pigou bound [27] that includes a parameter which we term as the Gamma bound. Combining the two, provides us bounds on the price of anarchy for non-atomic flows.
We show that the price of anarchy for the general class of convex heterogeneous functions can become unbounded, even growing with the flow requirement. This contrasts with results for delay functions that only depend on the aggregate flow, a model for which Roughgarden and Tardos [27] bound the price of anarchy in terms of a parameter α that measures the growth rate of the delay function.
However for the class of heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay functions, which include the standard affine functions, we provide bounds on the price of anarchy that are independent of the network size and the flow requirements. Our results show that the price of anarchy is bounded by a function of the polynomial size, degree and coefficients. We also discuss lower bound examples. These results extend previous work on the price of anarchy, more specifically the results that [27] presents. The existence of Nash Equilibrium for convex heterogeneous delays follows from the results in [27] which show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium flow in k-commodity non-atomic networks with convex delay functions.
In summary (also refer to Table 1 ):
• We generalize the Pigou bound [24, 27] and provide a multi-dimensional version, which is termed the Gamma-Pigou bound (section 2.1). This bound utilizes an independent term, defined as the Gamma bound. We show that the price of anarchy of selfish non-atomic routing in networks with heterogeneous delay functions can be obtained from combining these bounds.
• We provide examples (section 2.2) to illustrate that the price of anarchy for heterogeneous functions can become unbounded in the general case.
• We provide a bound on the price of anarchy in networks with k (types of) commodities where each edge is associated with heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay functions. This bound is (a max kN Φ ) θ+1 in the most general form of the network where N Φ represents the maximum number of terms in the delay function over all edges (section 2.4). We note that this bound is independent of the network size but grows with the number of commodity types and exponentially with respect to θ, the degree of the polynomial. A similar behavior is exhibited in the case of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions (section 2.3), where the price of anarchy bound is (θ+1)a max k θ−1 , which becomes 2a max for affine functions.
When we consider networks with heterogeneous affine (i.e., θ = 1) delay functions, the bound is k 2 N 2 Φ a 2 max + 2. Note that N Φ is bounded by k + 1. These bounds should be contrasted with the bound of 4/3 achieved when the delay on the edge is linearly dependent on the aggregate flow of the commodities on the edge.
The bounds illustrate an exponential growth with the degree of the polynomials and linear or polynomial growth with the value of a max .
• We provide an example(lemma 2.4) that illustrates the tightness of our bounds. The example network has a POA of a max (k − 1) θ−1 for large enough value of a max . This network provides an asymptotically tight bound for affine functions. Results for Atomic Network Flows: Our second set of results consider atomic flows. In the most general setting Nash equilibrium does not exist and thus wherever necessary we will assume that the instance provided has a Nash equilibrium. Our results for the case of atomic flows are summarized below (also refer to Table 2 ).
• We show the existence of Nash equilibrium for uniform heterogeneous affine delay functions. Our proof uses a potential function argument. Further, we show that for nonuniform heterogeneous functions, where edges have different delay functions, Nash Equilibrium need not exist (section 3.1). The second result is indeed surprising, especially since it only requires affine functions and unit demands (unweighted) to generate the examples. This contrasts with the fact that any unweighted congestion game with homogeneous delays, where the delay is a function of aggregate flows, has a pure Nash equilibrium [23, 16] • We consider the price of anarchy for atomic flow routing in networks with k (types of) commodities where each edge is associated with decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions (section 3.2).
When we consider networks with decomposable affine delay functions this bound is a max +2 and thus is dependent on the relative impact of the commodities. This contrasts with the constant PoA bound of 3+ √ 5 2
[4] when the delay function depends only on the aggregate flow.
In the case of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions, the bound is O(a θ+2 max N θ+1 Φ ). The above bounds utilize arguments based on a variational inequality that arises in these problems and satisfied by any Nash equilibrium solution.
Again, even in this case, the PoA does not depend on the network size but only on the characteristic of the delay function. However, the relative co-efficients in the delay function, a max , is a substantial factor. Contrast this with the bound when the delays are a function of the aggregate flows: the price of anarchy for aggregate delay functions is Θ(( θ log θ ) θ+1 ) [3] , independent of the relative weights of the types of commodities in the network or the number of commodities themselves.
Further, for atomic flows in networks with two different types of commodities and uniform delay functions, i.e., delays defined by a 1 f 1 (e) + a 2 f 2 (e) + c(e), we show an improved bound on the price of anarchy (Table 3 ). This is achieved by considering the cycles that arise when the Nash equilibrium and social optimum flows are overlaid, canceling common flows. By analyzing the flow in these cycles, we provide an asymptotically tight bound of √ a max + 2.
PoA affine θ-complete polynomial 
Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we consider bounds for the price of anarchy for non-atomic networks with decomposable delay functions. Further, in Section 3 we present our results for atomic flows and strengthen our results on the price of anarchy for two-commodity network flows with uniform delay functions in Section 3.3.
Part I: The Non-Atomic Case
In this section we consider the case of non-atomic network flow routing games. We consider heterogeneous functions with polynomial delays. Our contributions on bounds for the price of anarchy in non-atomic selfish routing problems have been summarized in Table 1 .
For general heterogeneous functions, the price of anarchy is unbounded as will be illustrated in Section 2.2. As the table shows, we obtain upper bounds on the price of anarchy for heterogeneous delays for the interesting cases where the function is decomposable and when we consider θ-complete polynomial delays.
To show bounds on PoA we will use the following variational inequality characterization [10] , the proof of which is simple and omitted. 
for every flowf feasible for (G, R, Φ).
The Gamma-Pigou Bound for the Price of Anarchy
We first establish an approach to determining the upper bounds on the price of anarchy for multidimensional delay functions. For simplicity we consider decomposable functions. While this theory is unrestricted, in that the bounds apply for arbitrary heterogeneous functions also, analysis indicates that the price of anarchy is unbounded in these cases. To simplify notations, we use f instead of f (e) when clear from the context. In the analysis of heterogeneous delay functions the standard Pigou bound arguments, designed for aggregate delay functions, do not apply. We thus consider a multi-dimensional version of the Pigou bound. Since that bound, by itself, does not suffice, we establish that the price of anarchy is bounded by the generalized Pigou bound and the Gamma bound, which we describe in detail below. In the subsequent subsection we analyze these bounds in the context of the delay functions defined by decomposable θ-complete polynomial functions.
We first describe the multi-dimensional version of the Pigou bound [27] as applied to flow vectors that represent the k types of commodities.
Definition 1 (Generalized Pigou bound) Let C be a nonempty set of cost functions, each func-
where r = (r 1 , . . . , r k ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ), r, x ∈ R k + with the understanding that 0/0 = 1, and
We split our analysis into two cases: 1)||x|| 1 < ||r|| 1 and 2)||x|| 1 ≥ ||r|| 1 . In the case when ||x|| 1 < ||r|| 1 , we consider the generalized Pigou bound as described above. However, we will evaluate the Pigou bound in a restricted setting by using the following mathematical program (SC):
. . , r k )) becomes positive and decreases the value of α(C). Thus w.l.o.g we add the constraint that Φ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) ≤ Φ(r 1 , . . . , r k ). For the second case, we will consider the second ratio, termed the Gamma Bound, defined above and restated in a form that will be used in the proof below:
Given flow vectors f andf , we will let E ||f (e)||>||f (e)|| be the set of all edges with the property that ||f (e)|| 1 > ||f (e)|| 1 .
We are now able to express the price of anarchy in terms of the above Pigou and Gamma bounds:
Theorem 2.2 (Gamma-Pigou Bound) Let C be a set of decomposable monotonically increasing delay functions. If (G, R, Φ) is an instance of a non-atomic k-commodity network flow routing game with delay function Φ ∈ C, then the price of anarchy in (G, R, Φ) is at most max{α(C), γ(C)}.
Proof: Letf and f be the optimal and Nash equilibrium flow, respectively, for a non-atomic instance (G, R, Φ) with delay functions in the set C. We let the total cost of flow f be C N E (f ). To prove the theorem we note that:
The first inequality follows from the definition of the Pigou bound applied to each edge in E ||f ||>||f || and the Gamma bound w.r.t. edges in E ||f ||≤||f || . Here we split the edge set into two cases as mentioned before : E ||f ||>||f || and E ||f ||≤||f || indicate a set of edges with ||f (e)|| 1 > ||f (e)|| 1 and ||f (e)|| 1 ≤ ||f (e)|| 1 , respectively. The second inequality can be obtained by rearranging terms in the first inequality and the third and the fourth terms in the second inequality can be combined together and ignored due to the variational inequality characterization presented in Lemma 2.1.
Price of Anarchy is Unbounded for Heterogeneous Polynomial Delays
In this subsection we show lower bounds on the price of anarchy in non-atomic networks with heterogeneous polynomial delay functions. It is surprising that even in 2-commodity networks with delay functions that are sums of monomials of single variables, the price of anarchy depends on the demand requirement. We first consider an example of a 2-commodity network with 2 edges, illustrated in Figure 1 . In this network, the top edge e 1 is associated with the delay function Φ i
where a 1 , a 2 and θ > 1. Demand requirements are defined as r 1 = r 2 = r (where r ≥ 2). The worst-case Nash equilibrium flow vector f is achieved when f 1 (e 1 ) = r and f 2 (e 2 ) = r and consequently the cost of Nash Equilibrium, C N E (f ) = (a 1 + a 2 )r θ+1 . In contrast the social optimum flowf can be obtained from f 2 (e 1 ) = r and f 1 (e 2 ) = r and the social optimum cost is
Note that this bound holds for heterogeneous functions that are also decomposable (by letting a 1 = a 2 = a), but does not hold for decomposable θ-complete polynomials, a class for which upper bounds will be illustrated in Section 2.3. Our next example network in Figure 2 shows that in fact the inefficiency of equilibrium can be much worse. In this network, the top edge e is associated with the delay function Φ e (f 1 (e), f 2 (e)) = We next consider the price of anarchy for k-commodity non-atomic network flow routing games where each edge is associated with a decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay function. The lower bounds obtained in the previous section used network instances where the polynomial delay function is not θ-complete. The first example does not satisfy the requirement that all terms have the same sum of exponents and the second example does not have all the non-cross terms corresponding to the two flow variables. As discussed in the introduction, it has been shown that Nash equilibrium flow is equivalent to a social optimum flow under homogeneous aggregate delay functions. However, generally this does not hold, and even for affine delay functions, PoA is bounded by 4/3. In this section we establish an upper bound for the PoA for heterogeneous decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions which, unfortunately, is worse than that for the classical aggregate functions used in [24, 27] .
A Lower Bound on PoA
We consider an example of a k-commodity network, with k edges, illustrated in Figure 3 . In this network, the ith edge e i is associated with the delay function Φ
. Demand requirements are defined as r 1 = . . . = r k = 1. We let a i = a > 1, ∀i. The worst-case Nash equilibrium (NE) flow vector f is achieved when f j (e j ) = 1, when 1 ≤ j ≤ k and consequently the NE cost C N E (f ) = ak. Conversely the social optimum flowf can be obtained by lettingf (e j ) = 1/(k − 1) when = j, 1 ≤ , j ≤ k for a large enough value of a and the social optimum has cost C SO (f ) = k/(k − 1) θ−1 . Let a max be as defined in Section 1.1. Then we have: 2 · · · f θ k k +c(e) where j=k j=1 θ j = θ and which, by the assumptions of θ-complete polynomials, includes the terms i a i f θ i , a i ∈ R ++ . In order to prove the price of anarchy we consider two cases depending on the relationship between ||f || 1 and ||f || 1 , where f andf are the Nash and optimum delay flows. First we consider the case when ||f || 1 ≤ ||f || 1 on edge e, for which we determine the Gamma bound. We will then find the Pigou bound for the converse inequality. Proof: For the case when f 1 + . . . + f k ≤f 1 + . . . +f k on edge e, w.l.o.g we minimize the social optimum delay by considering ||f || 1 = ||f || 1 . This can be achieved by reducing the flow on each of the dimensions. By monotonicity, Φ e (f ) decreases. For the remainder, we omit the dependency on e for simplicity. Let r = f and x =f . then
In inequality (2), represents -th term in the delay function Φ() and θ 1 + . . . + θ k = θ since the delay function is a decomposable θ-complete polynomial. To minimize the divisor we use only the sum of monomials, i a i f θ j , contained in Φ(f 1 , . . . , f k ). This term is lower bounded by min i a i (f θ 1 + . . . +f θ k ). Sincef 1 + . . . +f k = ||f || 1 the minimum value of the divisor is achieved whenf 1 = . . . =f k > ||f || 1 /k. Finally, (7) can be obtained. Now let us evaluate the Pigou bound for the case when ||f || 1 > ||f || 1 on an edge e. Lemma 2.6 Let C be a set of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions for nonatomic k-commodity network flow routing games. Then, α(C) ≤ (θ + 1)γ(C).
Proof:
We consider the value of the Pigou bound and fixing flow f , find a bound on the infimum of the denominator, β(C), that occurs in the expression for α(C). We let r = f and x =f and determine inff β(C) in terms of the vector f . Again we omit the dependency on e.
Given a requirement vector R we find a lower bound on β(C) as described above. The function β(C) is convex and thus by KKT conditions w.l.o.g assume thatf i > 0 and ∂β(C) ∂f i = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k }, where |{i ∈ K|f i > 0}| = k . Note thus that by the equations, ∂β(C)
which can be written as
Multiplying the above withf i gives that
and summing over all 1 ≤ i ≤ k ,
which is equivalent to
Since θ is the maximum degree and positive and all terms in ∂Φ(f ) ∂f i are nonnegative as all coefficients are nonnegative (by definition) andf has nonnegative components,
By eliminating ||f || 1 on both sides,
Further,
=⇒ β(C)
Thus,
= (θ + 1)γ(C)
Combining the above two bounds and using Theorem 2.2 we obtain the following result: In this section we show bounds on the price of anarchy in k-commodity non-atomic networks for heterogeneous affine and polynomial delay functions. The bound will be a function of the number of commodities k and N Φ , the maximum number of terms in the polynomial representing Φ i e (f ) over all edges, e, and commodities, i. Interestingly, there is no dependence on the size of the network.
Before proving the result we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.8 Let f be a Nash equilibrium flow andf be a social optimum flow vector in a nonatomic k-commodity flow routing game instance with heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay functions. Then
Proof: We use the variational inequality defined in Lemma 2.1(also see [10] ). The delay function may have two categories of terms : i) summation of all terms that consists of one variable and ii) summation of all terms that consists of at least two variables (referred to as cross terms). Let us first consider the part of the delay function that comprises terms of category (i). To simplify the presentation we first consider one such term in Φ i e (f ), i.e., the generic term a i (e)f θ (e). A bound on the contribution of the term to the delay is provided below: 
The term on the LHS in the first inequality arises on the RHS of the variational inequality. The first inequality holds since a max is the largest coefficient over all a ij . The second inequality can be obtained by applying Hölder's inequality. The third inequality is true since ∀l, f θ (e) ≤ Φ e (f ), given the assumption that all co-efficients of the polynomial Φ e (f ) have value greater than or equal to one. Finally, the last inequality follows since e (f (e))(Φ e (f )) ≤ C N E (f ).
For the second case, note that for any cross term the following is true:
. . , f θ k (e)) where θ 1 +. . .+θ k = θ in the second case. The -th term in the delay function for commodity i satisfies g i (e)f . . , f θ k (e)). The subsequent bound in this case is obtained similarly to the first case. Based on these two cases, we know that any term in Φ i e (f ) has the same upper bound, i.e., a max C SO (f )
Note that we have at most N Φ terms in Φ i e (f ) for each of the k commodities. The bound in the lemma follows, since
where the last inequality follows because i ef i (e)c i (e) ≤ i ef i (e)Φ i e (f ) = C SO (f ). We use the above lemma to prove the following result: Theorem 2.9 Let C be a set of heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay functions. If (G, R, Φ) is a non-atomic k-commodity network flow routing game instance with delay functions in C, then the price of anarchy of routing flow in (G, R, Φ) is at most (a max kN Φ + 1) θ+1 .
Proof: Due to Lemma 2.8,
where f is the Nash equilibrium flow andf the social optimum flow. Thus,
Thus P oA ≤ (a max kN Φ + 1) θ+1 .
k-commodity non-atomic -heterogeneous affine delay functions
We determine a bound on the price of anarchy in k-commodity non-atomic networks with heterogeneous affine delay functions. From Lemma 2.8, we have the following corollary: Corollary 2.10 Let f andf be a Nash equilibrium flow and a social optimum flow vector, respectively, in a non-atomic k-commodity network flow routing game instance with heterogeneous affine delay functions. Then
Also, in a fashion similar to Theorem 2.9, we have the following theorem. Theorem 2.11 Let C be a set of heterogeneous affine functions. If (G, R, Φ) is a k-commodity non-atomic network flow routing game instance with delay function in C, then the price of anarchy of routing flow in (G, R, Φ) is at most k 2 N 2 Φ a 2 max + 2.
Proof: Using Corollary 2.10
The result follows from determining an upper bound on x such that
Part II -PoA for Atomic Flows
In this section we consider atomic flows. We start with some negative results on the existence of Nash equilibrium. In general, Nash equilibrium does not exist, even for affine functions, as shown in Section 3.1. Note that this is somewhat surprising since it is well known that a congestion game with delay that is a function of aggregate load, or flow, has at least one pure Nash equilibrium [23, 16] . A positive outlook does exist: we show that Nash equilibrium exists when the heterogeneous delay functions are affine and uniform over the network. Our contributions for the price of anarchy in atomic selfish routing problems have been illustrated in Table 2 . For 2-commodity networks with uniform affine delay functions, we show (also see Table 3 ) improved bounds which are different from the bounds on general decomposable affine delay functions. The bound provided (Theorem 3.7) is an asymptotically tight bound as illustrated by the lower bound of Ω( √ a max ).
Existence of Atomic NE flow?
We first show that pure Nash equilibrium does not exist in the case of atomic, decomposable and affine delay functions with unweighted demand requirement. In Figure 4 , there are two Since the coefficient of the delay for user 2 is very large for the edges in P 1 and P 3 , user 2 will not utilize these paths. Thus, there are a total of eight pairs of paths each of which are chosen by user 1 and user 2, respectively as shown in Table 4 . The strategies of the two users will be represented by the pair of strategies (P, P ) where P and P Table 4 : Non-existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium belong to the set of 4 paths {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ). There exists a sequence of strategy pairs that cycle {(P 3 , P 2 ), (P 3 , P 4 ), (P 1 , P 4 ), (P 1 , P 2 )}. Further, other strategies are not stable. Strategy pairs (P 4 , P 2 ) and (P 2 , P 2 ) will shift to the strategy pair (P 3 , P 2 ) because P 3 is more beneficial to user 1. And lastly, strategy pairs (P 2 , P 4 ) and (P 4 , P 4 ) are unstable since the strategy pair (P 3 , P 4 ) is preferred by user 1. This example shows that there may be no pure Nash equilibrium in 2-commodity atomic networks where each edge is associated with an affine, decomposable delay function and each user has a requirement of one unit of demand (a case usually referred to as unweighted). However, in atomic networks when each edge is associated with an affine, uniform delay function, we show that there exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium. This proof applies to both unweighted and weighted demands and is based on the existence of a potential function. Proof: We start with considering delay functions of the form i a i (e)f i (e)+c(e). Let us define a potential function Ψ(f ) = e (d 2 (e) + j∈S(e) (a j (e)r j (e)) 2 ) where d(e) = k i=1 a i (e)r i (e) + c(e) for every feasible flow f and S(e) represents the set commodities utilizing edge e. We claim that a global minimum f of the potential function Ψ is also an equilibrium flow for (G, R, Φ). Let P i be the path used by commodity i in the solution that minimizes Ψ(f ). Assume, for a contradiction, that shifting from path P i to pathP i by user i, creating the flowf , strictly decreases its delay. In other words,
On the other hand, let us consider the potential function Ψ as user i deviates. For any edgeē in
For any edge e in P i \P i , we have a change of d 2 (e) − ((d(e) − a i (e)r i (e)) 2 − a 2 i (e)r 2 i (e)) = 2d(e)a i (e)r i (e). Thus,
The first equality holds due to the definition of potential function Ψ. Since we consider affine, uniform delay functions, a i (ē) = a i (e) = a i and this results in the second equality. Note that the third equality is satisfied because a i r i is the exact amount of delay increase after the user i deviation. Since the delay decreases after user i deviates, ∆(f,f ) is negative. Further, a i , r i > 0, and thus the potential function value atf is strictly less than the potential value at f , which contradicts that f is a global minimum.
k-commodity atomic decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions
In this section we provide bounds on the price of anarchy in k-commodity network flows with decomposable delay functions.
A Lower Bound on PoA
We show an example network in Figure 5 . In this network, the top edge e is associated with the is Ω(a max ) when a max ≥ 2.
Note that when a max = 1, i.e. in the aggregate model where all co-efficients are the same, an example with 4 players has been shown where the price of anarchy is 1 + φ ≈ 2.618 [4] .
An Upper Bound on PoA
In this section we provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy for k-commodity network atomic flows. We first consider affine delay functions, i.e., delay functions of the form Φ i (e) = j a j (e)f j (e) + c(e). We use the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to prove the following: Lemma 3.3 Let C be a set of affine decomposable delay functions. Let f andf be a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum atomic flow, respectively, in a k-commodity network flow routing game with delays in the class C. Then
Proof: Let f andf be a Nash equilibrium flow and a social optimum flow, respectively for this instance. Let P i andP i be paths, utilized by commodity i, in the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the social optimum solution, respectively. Then by the fact that P i is used at the NE solution, The inequality above holds due to the variational inequality. By multiplying both sides of the above inequality by r i and summing over all commodities, we have the following. Then, cost at Nash equilibrium is bounded above as follows: 
The third inequality can be obtained by utilizing the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. The last inequality depends on the co-efficients of the affine function being greater than or equal to one.
Using the above lemma we can determine the price of anarchy for the set of affine decomposable delay functions. Proof: From Lemma 3.3
and dividing by C SO (f ) gives
Then, we obtain a quadratic equation
We can extend the above proof to find an upper bound on the price of anarchy in k-commodity atomic networks with decomposable polynomial delay functions. 
Using the variational inequality applicable in the case of atomic flow routing, we get, for the ith commodity:
where f is the Nash equilibrium flow andf is the flow function with the ith commodity using P i instead of P i to route r i units of flow. The introduction of the ith commodity to edges in the path P i adds a number of terms to the delay. Consider the following sum of delay terms on edge e whenf i (e) is nonzero.
wheref j (e) = f j (e), j = i is nonzero andf i (e) = r i . Consider one such term T = g (e)f
k . If i = arg max j:e∈P j r j then T ≤ g (e)r θ i (note that r i ∈ N). Alternatively, T ≤ g (e)f θ m where m = arg max j:e∈P j r j . In both cases, T ≤ a max Φ e (f ). A similar analysis holds for the terms introduced by the ith commodity in the delay of other commodities. Since there are N Φ terms in the delay function, we get:
Multiplying both sides of Equation (19) by r i , applying Equation (20) and summing over all commodities and edges we get:
The bound on the price of anarchy is thus O(a θ+2 max N θ+1 Φ ).
Improved PoA for Affine Delays
In this subsection we provide improved bounds for atomic flows when the delay function is affine and uniform modulo differences in the constant term, i.e., Φ(e) = i a i f i (e) + c(e).
Lower Bounds on PoA for Uniform Delay Functions
In fact, even for the class of affine functions that does not have a constant term, we provide an example ( Figure 6 ) which shows that the PoA is Ω( √ a). In this example the delay function associated with the edges is af 1 + f 2 + af 3 is at least (amax) 1/2 +2 3 , i.e., Ω( √ a max ).
We also show an almost matching upper bound in the following.
Almost tight upper bound for Uniform Functions
Theorem 3.7 Let C be a set of affine delay functions that are uniform up to differences in the constant term. If (G, R, Φ) is an atomic 2-commodity network flow routing game instance with delay functions in C, then the price of anarchy of atomic flow routing in (G, R, Φ) is at most √ a max + 2 and this is almost tight as shown in Lemma 3.6.
The proof of Theorem 3.7 is shown below. Recall that the theorem claims that if (G, R, Φ) is an atomic 2-commodity instance with uniform affine delay functions, then the price of anarchy of (G, R, Φ) is at most √ a max + 2.
Proof Outline: The proof proceeds by comparing both the Nash equilibrium solution and the optimum solution. Removing the common flows between the two, a set of cycles are obtained such that by reversing flow on these cycles, one flow can be transformed to the other. The price of anarchy is obtained using the structure of these cycles. We show that we can obtain the PoA by considering one cycle only and analyzing the worst case behavior depending on how the two, the Nash equilibrium and the optimum flows, utilize the edges of the cycle. The analysis is by cases; we obtain sixteen possibilities but three cases dominate all other cases and thus we provide an upper bound of the PoA for these three cases. The analysis uses variational inequalities to determine the relationship between the Nash equilibrium and optimum flow.
Reducing to Cycles: Consider F = (F −F ) (F −F ) where F andF are a Nash equilibrium flow and a social optimum flow, respectively. Further we let F 1 and F 2 denote the sub-flows of F at a Nash equilibrium flow for commodity 1 and commodity 2, respectively. Similarly, we letF 1 andF 2 denote the social optimum flow for commodity 1 and commodity 2, respectively. Note that cancels common flows in F andF . In the figures below that illustrate the various cases, we let edges in F 1 F 1 be thicker and edges in F 2 F 2 be thinner lines.
By reversing the flow inF and partitioning F 1 F 1 and F 2 F 2 , respectively, we obtain a set of cycles for commodity 1 and commodity 2. We let the cycles represented by thicker lines be denoted by CC 1 for commodity 1 and cycles represented by the thinner lines by CC 2 for commodity 2. Note that an edge could be utilized by commodity 1 as well as commodity 2, and it can occur in cycles of both commodities.
Analyzing PoA bounds for Cycles: We need a lemma which show that there exists a good partition of the cycles so that we can obtain an almost tight upper bound. Let (a i , b i ) be a collection of pairs where 1 ≤ i ≤ d : a i , b i ∈ R + . Let Π be a set of partitions of I = {1, . . . , d} such that
• If π = (π 1 , . . . , π ) ∈ Π then |π j | ≤ 2, Note the following are true
• If π = (π 1 , . . . , π ) ∈ Π then j π j = I,
• If π j 1 , π j 2 ∈ π and π j 1 = π j 2 then π j 1 π j 2 = ∅. where π = (π 1 , . . . , π q ) and π j corresponds to the j-th part and is a subset (of at most 2 elements) of I of size t j , i.e., π j = {x 1 , . . . , x t j }. Then
We next show that PoA can be estimated by considering at most one cycle per commodity instead of all cycles. Throughout this subsection, let a = a 1 /a 2 where a 1 and a 2 represent coefficients of commodity 1 and commodity 2 in the affine uniform delay function.
Let CC be the set of all cycles and Π be a set of partitions of CC. Consider a partitionπ of CC where each part is of size either 1 or of size 2 (in which case it contains 1 cycle from each commodity, C 1 ∈ CC 1 and C 2 ∈ CC 2 ). Let the pair (f 1 , f 2 ) and (f 1 ,f 2 ) be the Nash equilibrium flow of commodity 1 and commodity 2 and the social optimum flow of commodity 1 and commodity 2, respectively. Letπ = {π 1 , . . . ,π q } be a partition which guarantees the optimum amongst partitions in Π. Then, 
,
where Φ C 1 () and Φ C 2 () represent cost incurred in C 1 and C 2 , respectively. The first inequality holds due to Lemma 3.8. In the last inequality, we have |π j | = 2 for the first factor and |π j | = 1 for the second and third factors. In Lemma 3.8, we showed that the maximum cost element in π provides an upper bound for C N E (f )/C SO (f ). So, the partitionπ considered here provides an upper bound for C N E (f )/C SO (f ). Later we will show that this partition is good enough to obtain an almost tight bound for C N E (f )/C SO (f ).
To analyze the price of anarchy, we consider the structure of the cycles.
Cycle Structure: In this subsection we consider the structure of the cycles obtained in F F . One type of cycle obtained is illustrated in Figure 8 . Here u and v are starting and end nodes such that reversing off 1 leads to a cycle. Though there are cycles for commodity 1 and commodity 2, we consider cycles for commodity 1. We consider flow from commodity 1 as a primary flow and flow from commodity 2 as a secondary flow, respectively. The case when flow from commodity 2 is a primary flow is symmetric to this case. Note that though we consider cycles from commodity 1, it is possible that those might be intersected with cycles from commodity 2. We show an example of a cycle from commodity 1 intersecting with a flow of commodity 2 in Figure 8 . In Depending on how the NE flow and social optimum flow use the top and bottom path in the cycle, we have sixteen possibilities. We show that three cases dominate all other cases and thus we provide an upper bound of the PoA for these three cases.
Notation: As shown in Figure 8 , we have two paths, termed as top path and bottom path. Throughout this section, let Φ P i (f 1 , f 2 ) be cost of path P i when flow on path P of commodity 1 is f 1 and that on path P of commodity 2 is f 2 . We define Φ P i (f 1 , f 2 ) as the cost when restricted to a subset of edges P ⊆ P i , which is utilized by both f 1 and f 2 . Similarly for P ⊆ P let Φ P i (f 1 , 0) (or Φ P i (0, f 2 )) be defined as the cost function over a set of edges P which is utilized by f 1 (or f 2 ), but not both. Note that P P = ∅. For simplicity, we define
Also, throughout this subsection we let P 1 , P 2 correspond to edges containing flows of both commodities in the top path and the bottom path from u 1 to v 1 , respectively. And we let P 3 and P 4 correspond to the edges common to both flows on the top path and the bottom path from u 2 to v 2 , respectively as shown in Figure 9 . Lastly, we define 1 = |{e ∈ P 1 E}|, 2 = |{e ∈ P 2 E}|, 3 = |{e ∈ P 3 E}| and 4 = |{e ∈ P 4 E}|. Remember that f 1 =f 1 = r 1 and Three cases are enough to be considered: Note the f andf correspond to a NE flow and a social optimum flow. We consider all possible cases when commodity 1 flow is considered 
By reversingf 1 , each of the structures considered becomes a directed cycle. As mentioned before f 2 orf 2 (or both) use edges in these cycles. Table 5 lists the cases and a ratio of C N E (f ) to C SO (f ) variational inequality case 1,5
case 12,15 Table 5 : C N E (f )/C SO (f ) for all cases corresponding (variational) inequality (we use the term, variational inequality here imprecisely simply to emphasize properties of the solution ) obtained by the flow being Nash equilibrium. Let us consider case 16 to show an example of how to construct formulas for C N E (f )/C SO (f ) using the corresponding variational inequality. There are two NE flows f 1 and f 2 over the top path, and the cost of NE for commodity 1 is f 1 Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ); while, the cost of SO for commodity 1 is incurred only byf 1 which results inf 1 Φ 2 (f 1 , 0). Its corresponding variational inequality is Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) ≤ Φ 2 (f 1 , f 2 ) + Φ 2 (f 1 , 0) since a shift of flow f 1 to the bottom path (note that f 2 already exists) does not decrease the cost incurred by f 1 and f 2 over the top path.
(i) cases 1, 5, 7 and 13: Note that both case 1 and case 5 have the same ratio of C N E (f ) to C SO (f ) and variational inequality, and case 7 and case 13 use the same ratio of C N E (f ) to C SO (f ) and variational inequality. Then price of anarchy as computed in case 1 and case 5 is upper bounded by that computed in case 7(case 13) since the divisor in case 7(case 13) is smaller than divisors in other two cases since f 1 =f 1 = r 1 and f 2 =f 2 = r 2 .
In case 7 (or 13), note that there is no social optimum flow from commodity 2 in the ratio of C N E (f ) to C SO (f ), and the NE cost incurred by commodity 2 can be considered from cycles with flow of commodity 2. However, f 2 has impact on latency of f 1 , and we consider f 1 Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) as cost incurred by f 1 and f 2 .
The first inequality holds since f 1 =f 1 = r 1 and f 2 =f 2 = r 2 due to the definition of atomic unsplittable flow. The last inequality holds since Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) ≤ Φ 2 (f 1 , 0) due to its corresponding variational inequality.
(ii) cases 2, 3, 9 and 16: Since the divisor for case 2 and case 16 is smaller than divisors in case 3 and case 9, the price of anarchy in case 3 and case 9 are dominated by the other two cases. For both case 2 or case 16, we have the following inequality:
= r 1 Φ 2 (r 1 , r 2 ) + r 1 Φ 2 (r 1 , 0) r 1 Φ 2 (r 1 , 0)
≤ Φ 2 (r 1 , r 2 ) Φ 2 (r 1 , 0)
= a 2 2 (ar 1 + r 2 + c 2 ) a 2 2 (ar 1 + c 2 ) ≤ 1 + r 2 ar 1
In (22), Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) ≤ Φ 2 (f 1 , f 2 ) + Φ 2 (f 1 , 0) due to the corresponding variational inequality. We have c 2 = c 2 /a 2 in (25) . It seems that the price of anarchy for these cases are not bounded since f 2 appears in the dividend while the divisor does not includef 2 . However, if r 2 is big enough (larger than a √ ar 1 ) then r 2 play an important role. Thus, we consider splitting into two cases : r 2 ≤ a √ ar 1 and r 2 > a √ ar 1 . In the case that r 2 ≤ a √ ar 1 , the price of anarchy is bounded by √ a + 1. We next discuss the price of anarchy when r 2 > a √ ar 1 . Note that we assume that there is an intersection of a commodity 2 cycle with this cycle when r 2 > a √ ar 1 . If there is no intersection with a commodity 2 cycle, then f 1 can be shifted from the top path to the bottom path leading to less delay. If the delay on the top path and the delay on the bottom path are the same, then there is no cycle. Suppose that the shift from the top path to the bottom path of f 1 does not decrease delay. It implies that the cost of the bottom path is greater than the cost of the top path and potentially violates utilizing the bottom path byf 1 is less cost than using the top path.
Let us consider the cycle of commodity 2. f 2 goes along top path overlapped with f 1 orf 1 on the bottom path. The flow f 2 and the other flowf 2 forms the cycle of commodity 2 which is intersecting with a cycle shown in case 2. For this cycle, we derive the price of anarchy via the corresponding variational inequality.
C N E (f )
= r 1 Φ 2 (r 1 , r 2 ) + r 2 Φ 4 (r 1 , r 2 ) r 1 Φ 2 (r 1 , 0) + r 2 Φ 4 (0, r 2 )
= r 1 2 (ar 1 + r 2 + c 2 ) + r 2 4 (ar 1 + r 2 + c 4 ) r 1 2 (ar 1 + c 2 ) + r 2 4 (r 2 + c 4 ) (30) = r 1 (ar 1 + r 2 + c 2 ) + r 2 (ar 1 + r 2 + c 4 ) r 1 (ar 1 + c 2 ) + r 2 (r 2 + c 4 ) (31) = 1 + r 1 r 2 + ar 1 r 2 r 1 (ar 1 + c 2 ) + r 2 (r 2 + c 4 )
.
We have Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 )+Φ 2 (0, f 2 )+Φ 3 (f 1 , f 2 )+Φ 3 (0, f 2 ) ≤ Φ 4 (f 1 , f 2 ) due to the variational inequality for commodity 2 and Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) + Φ 1 (f 1 , 0) ≤ Φ 2 (f 1 , f 2 ) + Φ 2 (f 1 , 0) due to the variational inequality for commodity 1. By these observations, we can obtain (27) from the previous equation. Inequality (28) can be obtained by summing over Φ 2 (f 1 , f 2 ) and Φ 2 (f 1 , 0) by replacing Φ 2 (f 1 , 0) as Φ 2 (f 1 , f 2 ). Let = 2 / 4 where 2 and 4 represent the number of edges on path 2 and path 4, respectively. Also, let c 2 = c 2 /a 2 , c 4 = c 4 /a 2 throughout this chapter. From the above variational inequality Φ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) + Φ 2 (0, f 2 ) + Φ 3 (f 1 , f 2 ) + Φ 3 (0, f 2 ) ≤ Φ 4 (f 1 , f 2 ) we have Φ 2 (0, f 2 ) ≤ Φ 4 (f 1 , f 2 ) and further = 2 / 4 ≤ ar 1 + r 2 + c 4 r 2 + c 2 ≤ ar 1 + r 2 + c 4 r 2 .
When ar 1 +r 2 +c 4 r 2 +c 2 ≤ 1, let be 0 in the divisor and be 1 for the dividend. Then, equation (32) can be written as
C SO (f ) ≤ 1 + r 1 r 2 + ar 1 r 2 r 2 (r 2 + c 4 ) ≤ 1 + r 1 r 2 + ar 1 r 2 r 2
The last inequality holds because r 2 ≥ a √ ar 1 , and a ≥ 1. When 
Observe that (ar 1 + c 2 ) can be ignored to obtain the upper bound in (37). In equations, to maximize the price of anarchy we substitute r 1 with r 2 /a √ a in the dividend; while in the divisor we substitute r 2 with a √ ar 1 .
(iii) cases 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15: Note that the divisors in case 6, 10 and 11 are smaller than the divisors in other cases, and the dividend in case 6, 10 and 11 are bigger than others due to the variational inequality. We consider one of the cases 6, 10 and 11. As shown in previous case, we need to consider commodity 1's cycle and commodity 2's cycle to estimate the price of anarchy. We provide a proof of a case whenf 2 is utilizing the top path. Let us consider case 6 which upper bounds other two cases. we split into three sub-cases: (a) r 1 ≤ r 2 ≤ (a) 1/2 r 1 , (b) r 1 > r 2 and (c) r 2 > (a) 1/2 r 1 . In case (a), Due to the variational inequality, we have (39) by replacing Φ 1 (f 1 , 0) with Φ 2 (f 1 , f 2 ). In inequality (43), we substitute r 2 with √ ar 1 . In case (b), we start at (40) to avoid duplicate formulas.
C SO (f ) ≤ r 1 1 (ar 1 + r 2 + c 2 ) + r 2 2 (r 2 + c 2 ) r 1 1 (ar 1 + c 2 ) + r 2 2 (r 2 + c 1 ) (45) ≤ 1 + 1 r 1 r 2 + 2 r 2 c 2 1 (ar 2 1 + r 1 c 2 ) + 2 (r 2 2 + r 2 c 1 ) 
